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A GATHERING OF DIFFERENT IDEAS
Rabi, Uzi, ed. International Intervention in Local Conflicts: Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution since
the Cold War. New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010. 326pp. $99

This edited volume presents an insightful collection of case studies assessing
international interventions in the post–
Cold War era, with a strong emphasis
on the Middle East. The essays offer a
broad exploration of international conflict management and resolution, taking
a hard look at failure and success. Unlike many other books, this one brings
together scholars from different countries, presenting an often unique and
most importantly different viewpoint
on conflicts of U.S. interest. It is impractical to review each chapter, but the
following five are particularly compelling for U.S. readership. The attempts
of the European Union (EU) to mediate
the Balkan and ongoing Israel-Palestine
conflicts present a detailed account of
EU conflict management in the larger
context of the difficulties brought about
by institutional challenges and the complex structure of EU policies. A French
perspective on Middle Eastern politics
is elucidated by Jean-Pierre Filiu. The
value of French diplomatic efforts to
conflict resolution is highlighted, with
the example of the direct contact with
Syria and Iran during Operation

GRAPES OF WRATH in 2006. Comparing
France to the United States, the author
points out different narratives, citing
such examples as Beirut 1982. The next
chapter delves into the important topic
of clashes between the Islamic denominations, Sunni and Shia. The feeling of
alienation between these groups dates
back to the earliest days of Islam. U.S.
interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan
are discussed as a starting point for
increased Iranian support for Shias
throughout the Middle East and to confute the common argument that Shias
are more sympathetic to Iran than to
their home countries. No conclusion is
offered about “whether sectarianism is
the cause or symptom of the recent geopolitical changes in the region,” but the
authors do provide informative insight
and point to the importance of understanding these dynamics for any conflict resolution in the region. Chapter
12 explores the motives of the involvement of regional actors in the IsraelPalestine conflict. Egypt and Saudi
Arabia both have interests in being
perceived as the indispensable Arab mediator. Ultimately, Egypt has a larger
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stake, because of its proximity and domestic politics considerations, and it
has stayed committed throughout,
while Saudi Arabia has less of an incentive to guarantee that efforts become
reality.
The concluding chapter stimulates the
reader to think about the term “international community.” Rajan Menon offers a sharp yet pessimistic evaluation
of the international community’s
efforts to react to grave human rights
violations and its “inability to act, particularly when it encounters opposition
from its most powerful states.” While
he displays minimal confidence in governments, the author remains optimistic that one day people will change and
cure the “weakness of we-ness,” thereby
initiating real institutional change. A
common ground for all essays is the
critical analysis of international efforts
to resolve conflicts. Every author strives
to answer important questions regarding the motivations of external actors to
become involved. Overall, this volume
presents a valuable contribution and is
essential reading for anyone looking to
understand the struggles of international conflict management.
LARISSA FORSTER

Naval War College

Fisher, David, and Brian Wicker, eds. Just War on
Terror? A Christian and Muslim Response. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2010. 231pp. $29.95

This edited volume provides fourteen
essays on various aspects of combating
terrorism and insurgencies from a justwar perspective. All the contributors,
with the exception of Philip Bobbitt,
an American, are from the United
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Kingdom. Contributors are prominent
members of their respective faculties
and are well-known within the fields of
war and security studies. While the subtitle accentuates religious traditions
with respect to the just-war tradition,
the volume is not a dialogue between
religious perspectives, nor is every
chapter devoted to religious interpretations. Rather, the book is a collection of
essays, of which two are authored by
practicing Muslim scholars. Apart from
these essays, the religious dimensions
of combating terrorism are not prominently presented.
The two essays by Islamic scholars are
especially helpful for readers interested
in the religious dynamics of post-9/11
terrorism. In the first, “Terrorism and
Islamic Theologies of ReligiouslySanctioned War,” Tim Winter, who lectures in Islamic studies at the University
of Cambridge and is an imam at the
Cambridge Mosque, recounts the interaction of Islamic jurisprudence with the
emerging international system of the
nineteenth century, as scholars and
leaders in Muslim countries have
sought to integrate various religious interpretations with international political realities. He also provides a useful
overview of the concepts of jihad and
hiraba. The second significant essay is
that of Ahmad Achtar, “Challenging
Al-Qa'ida’s Justification of Terror.”
Achtar is a lecturer in Islamic studies at
Heythrop College, University of London, and he argues, with documentation, that al-Qa'ida’s justifications of
terror are not part of mainstream Sunni
religious and legal thought and are not
shared by the majority of Muslims.
Other essays focus more on aspects of
the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan
and on tenets of the just-war tradition.
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Of these, three essays in particular stand
out as of interest to readers of this journal: Sir Michael Howard’s “Philip
Bobbitt’s Terror and Consent: A Brief
Critique,” Brian Wicker’s “Just War
and State Sovereignty,” and David
Fisher’s “Terror and Pre-emption: Can
Military Pre-emption Ever Be Just?”
In the final chapter, the editors offer a
reflection on countering terrorism
justly after 9/11. In these few pages they
provide an excellent summary of the
weaknesses of al-Qa'ida and the likelihood of its eventual demise. They also
remind readers of the necessity of
maintaining ethical standards in the
midst of conflict: “A common thread
running through all the lessons learnt
has thus been a rediscovery of the importance of morality even amidst and,
indeed, particularly amidst the pressures and passions of conflict.”
As with most edited volumes, not every
chapter will appeal to everyone. However, for anyone interested in contemporary just-war thought, its viability,
and its relevance to twenty-first-century
warfare, there is much in this volume
on which to reflect.
TIMOTHY J. DEMY

Naval War College

Cheney, Dick, with Liz Cheney. In My Time: A
Personal and Political Memoir. New York:
Threshold Editions, 2011. 565pp. $35

As political memoirs go, Dick Cheney’s
In My Time is arguably one of the more
candid, in a genre that tends to fall into
two categories—the remarkably bland
and the overly fulsome. Cheney avoids
both these pitfalls in a book that will

not change the mind of a single Cheney
hater or his small legion of admirers.
Cheney was at the center of American
politics for almost forty years, and long
before he became the Darth Vader of
American politics he had a reputation
for being one of the ablest and most
reform-minded members of the Republican Party. He had an “A-list” résumé,
including stints as the youngest chief of
staff in the history of the White House;
as the nation’s seventeenth secretary of
defense, presiding over Operation DESERT STORM; and as a key member of the
GOP’s leadership in the House of Representatives. So it was no surprise when
Texas governor George W. Bush asked
Cheney to lead his vice-presidential
search committee in the spring of 2000.
It was a surprise, however, when Bush
selected his search committee chair to
be his running mate, for Cheney
brought few political benefits to the Republican ticket. Yet as In My Time
makes clear, Cheney’s Washington experience and national-security credentials were seen as an asset to Governor
Bush. “You know, Dick, you’re the solution to my problem” was the way
Bush broached the subject to him.
In short order, Cheney became the
point man for all that was seen as wanting in the Bush administration and, in
the view of some, for all that was criminal. For the tiny cadre of moderate Republicans who urged the administration
to move “to the center” and trim “our
sails” in the wake of the divisive election of 2000, Cheney made it clear that
the administration would not alter its
conservative agenda. He infuriated congressional Democrats by refusing to release the lists of “everyone we met with”
when he chaired the administration’s
energy policy task force, and after the
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attacks of 9/11, when he observed that
the nation would have to work “the
dark side, if you will,” Cheney was seen
by many as a champion of un-American
practices, including water boarding and
warrantless wiretapping. Cheney vigorously defends both programs, arguing
that the wiretapping “saved lives and
prevented attacks. If I had it to do all
over again, I would, in a heartbeat.”
The administration’s “liberation” of
Iraq, which, in concert with the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, dramatically
eroded public support for President
Bush, is also vigorously defended, although Cheney concedes that “we could
have done things better” in terms of
dealing with Katrina.
Cheney and his loyal lieutenants, I.
Lewis “Scooter” Libby and David
Addington, saw themselves as restoring
the American presidency to the status it
had held prior to Vietnam and Watergate. Some refer to this bygone era as
one dominated by an “imperial presidency,” but for Cheney it was the natural, constitutional, order of things.
Presidential precedents were on their
side but the quiet constitutional revolution that occurred while Cheney served
as Gerald Ford’s chief of staff—a revolution that produced an adversarial media with no qualms about releasing the
nation’s most closely held secrets; a judiciary willing to overrule executive and
legislative war powers, while sometimes
invoking elements of international law;
and a Congress eager to challenge presidents on sensitive national-security issues, including intelligence matters—
triumphed in the end. Bush and Cheney
left office as discredited figures, and
while both remain optimistic that history will vindicate them, this book
makes a strong case that some of the
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administration’s actions deserve a sober
second look. However, far too much
seems to be at stake for that to occur.
STEPHEN F. KNOTT

Naval War College

Boyne, Walter J. How the Helicopter Changed
Modern Warfare. Gretna, La.: Pelican, 2011.
352pp. $29.95

“In either case, the helicopter has significantly changed the face of modern
warfare. It has done so despite restrictions placed on its performance by its
inherent design features. And perhaps
more than anything else, it has done so
because of the brave, talented aircrews
who flew the helicopter in the most intensely dangerous conditions of warfare
that have ever been seen.”
So concludes the final chapter of a new
and timely book by noted aviation
writer and retired U.S. Air Force colonel Walter Boyne. This volume revolves
around two theses. The first is stated in
the title: helicopters, since their introduction, have produced dramatic
changes in the conduct of warfare. The
second thesis suggests that helicopters
themselves have failed to keep pace with
the very changes caused by their introduction. The conclusions drawn from
this corollary idea are likely to prove
controversial.
Boyne’s prose combines accuracy with
regard to technological issues with a
clarity that renders these complex ideas
accessible, even to readers unfamiliar
with the intricacies of rotorcraft aeronautics. The scientific and engineering
challenges are interwoven with the stories of such industry pioneers as Igor
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Sikorsky, Frank Piasecki, and Arthur
Young. The narrative offers a tip of the
hat to the Marine Corps, acknowledging that institution’s decision to champion this emerging technology, as well
as the parts played by the Navy and
Coast Guard, but the strength of this
book resides in its examination of the
helicopter’s influence on combat over
land.
The Vietnam War serves as the lens
through which the rapid development
of helicopter-borne operations is studied. Anecdotes about operational leaders whose vision married capabilities
provided by industry with the arduous
conditions of the Southeast Asian battlefield provide evidence of how modern warfare was changed. Anecdotal
evidence is supported by statistics detailing the number of troops and the
amount of material transported within
the theater, as well as the grim losses
suffered in accomplishing these missions. Within the Vietnam context, the
tactical and operational impacts of rotarywing aircraft are clearly demonstrated.
The argument revolves around the
postwar failure to maintain the wartime
momentum.
The discussion of the post-Vietnam developments asks difficult and uncomfortable questions. Delving into the
fiscal disparity between the research
and development efforts supporting
fixed-wing, tactical aircraft and similar
efforts for the benefit of rotary-wing
aviation, the author reaches conclusions
that may be disconcerting for advocates
of traditional airpower. This critique of
overspending on fixed-wing research
and development at the expense of survivability, lethality, and capability for
rotary-wing aircraft gives the book a
controversial edge.

Walter Boyne has delivered a timely
study that asks difficult, important
questions about the future of military
aviation, especially in an era when the
nature of combat operations is rapidly
evolving. For these questions alone, it is
a worthwhile read. The lucid analysis of
the technological issues and the compelling stories of the pioneers and warriors who brought the helicopter to
prominence are icing on the cake.
K. J. DELAMER

Naval War College

Tully, Anthony P. Battle of Surigao Strait. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2009. 329pp. $18.45

The sprawling battle of Leyte Gulf was
fought from 23 to 26 October 1944, and
nearly seventy years later it still has the
power both to fire the imagination and
to provide enduring military lessons. As
drama goes, the battle (or more precisely, a series of engagements, each
deserving a name of its own) is an apparently bottomless cornucopia of
personalities, desperate gambles, and
heroism, as well as of enough “what-ifs”
to spawn a cottage industry of alternate
histories. In at least one way, Leyte Gulf
has similarities to Gettysburg. Both battles have been written about so extensively that some authors focus on the
smaller engagements that together complete the picture of the larger conflict.
The basic story of Leyte is a familiar
one. Faced with growing U.S. naval
power, a steadily weakening fleet, and
initial American landings in the Philippines, Japanese naval authorities initiated a bold stroke. Using their precious
remaining carriers as bait, they drew off
Admiral William F. Halsey’s Third Fleet
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while they attempted to reach the U.S.
beachhead with powerful surface forces
approaching through the San Bernardino
and Surigao Straits. The majority of
power would be contained in Admiral
Takeo Kurita’s Central Force, which
would force the San Bernardino Strait
and approach the U.S. transports from
the east. Two smaller but still potentially deadly forces, commanded by Admirals Shoji Nishimura and Kiyohide
Shima, would attempt the Surigao
Strait and attack the Americans from
the south. Kurita’s force came closer to
victory, but, due in part to a gallant defense by inferior U.S. forces, and with
the counsel of his own forces, Kurita
turned back on the doorstep of success.
In contrast, Nishimura never had a
chance. Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf
turned the Surigao Strait into a killing
sack. As Nishimura drove deeper into
the strait, his forces were treated to
wave after wave of attacks that ended in
a crescendo of firepower, as Oldendorf’s
main battle line put an end to the Japanese southern attack.
Rather than write only about the big
picture, Tully puts Surigao Strait under
a microscope. Drawing extensively
from little (or never) -accessed Japanese
records, he painstakingly pulls together
his account of the battle. Each Japanese
ship is discussed in detail, each commanding officer is subjected to scrutiny,
and communications are reviewed. The
result is impressive: what emerges is a
convincing and incredibly detailed account of this segment of the battle.
In re-creating the battle, Tully takes on
several “mysteries” that have endured
since 1944. The first is the fate of the
Japanese battleship Fuso. It is known
that the ship was destroyed, but the exact circumstances of its sinking have
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been a matter of conjecture. The next
mystery is the sinking of the Japanese
destroyer Michishiro. In this instance
there is uncertainty regarding the claim
that USS Hutchins (DD 476) sank it. Finally, Tully seeks to discover the exact
manner in which the Japanese destroyer
Yamashiro was sunk. By Tully’s own
admission, these issues are military minutiae, but they are important to him.
He obviously wants to know where U.S.
torpedoes struck the doomed Yamashiro
and what happened to Fuso.
Tully’s writing style, for the most part,
is pleasant, analytical, and temperate,
although from time to time the neutral
tone of the distant observer shifts to a
more impassioned vernacular, particularly when Tully is arguing a position or
describing some especially dramatic
moment. However, the result is not
problematic. It is Tully’s personal passion for the subject that elevates this
book above many naval histories, along
with his eagerness to present the Japanese point of view. This is a perspective
that with few exceptions is lacking in
Western accounts.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College

Busch, John Laurence. Steam Coffin: Captain Moses Rogers and the Steamship Savannah Break the
Barrier. New Canaan, Conn.: Hodos Historia,
2010. 726pp. $35

One of the great events in American,
and indeed world, maritime history occurred in the summer of 1819, when the
American steamship Savannah, commanded by Captain Moses Rogers, became the first steam-powered vessel to
cross the Atlantic Ocean. Its pioneer
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voyage from Savannah, Georgia, to Liverpool, England, in May and June 1819
is sometimes mentioned as an epochmaking event that marked the coming
age of the steamship. While the ship
was remembered 140 years later, when
in 1959 its name was given to the first
American nuclear-powered merchant
vessel, the context and the details of the
pioneer voyage were overlooked. The
1819 voyage was quickly dismissed as a
commercial failure in which steam
power was used for only a fraction of
the time; the ship itself was forgotten as
a short-lived phenomenon after its
shipwreck on Long Island in 1821.
Certainly, Savannah was far ahead of its
time, as it would take another twenty
years for steamships to begin regular
transatlantic passages and thirty years
before there was another American
steamship to carry the flag across the
Atlantic. Despite all the innovation that
the 1819 voyage of Savannah represents, however, there is remarkably
little historical investigation of it.
Savannah’s captain, Moses Rogers, has
been almost completely overlooked as
an innovator. Up until the appearance
of this fine work, Frank O. Braynard’s
1963 study S.S. Savannah the Elegant
Steam Ship was the only major work on
the subject.
For the Connecticut-based independent
historian John Laurence Busch, the tale
of Captain Rogers and his steamship
Savannah is clearly a passionate labor of
love. With exemplary research, Busch
followed an archival trail that led to
twenty-two historical manuscript depositories in the United States, ranging
from Portland, Maine, to Savannah,
and which included ten massive record
groups in the National Archives.

Moreover, following the wake of the
ship, Busch’s research carried him to
archives in Denmark, Russia, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. Equally impressive is his productive research in
nearly 150 contemporary newspapers
that matches his archival range and extends beyond to India, Ireland, and
Norway. All of this, Busch has marshaled into a beautifully written and engaging narrative that places his solidly
based factual details within a broad
context. It is a complex story, but one
that is clearly presented.
The book opens with an evocative description of Moses Rogers’s involvement in the introduction of the first
steam passenger service between
Charleston, South Carolina, and Savannah, Georgia. The author then traces
back to the early rise of steam propulsion in the United States and Moses
Rogers’s story from his birth in New
London, Connecticut, through his career as a pioneer steamboat captain on
the Hudson River, then as steamship
designer and founder of the Savannah
Steamship Company. In detailing Savannah’s pioneer transatlantic voyage,
Busch effectively covers the entire range
of issues from finances to the many different characters in the ship’s company.
Not stopping there, he explores the
public reception and professional interest in the ship’s further onward passages to Denmark, Sweden, and Russia,
including its return home across the Atlantic. In conclusion, Busch reflects that
while the achievements of Rogers and
Savannah have sometimes been lost to
collective memory, they broke a
psychological barrier that had hindered
such technological innovation up to
that point.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012

NWC_2012WinterReview_BR.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Winter2012Review\NWC_2012WinterReview.vp
Monday, December 05, 2011 11:07:20 AM

7

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 1, Art. 10

Produced by a heretofore-unknown
publisher, Steam Coffin is enhanced by
more than a dozen well-drawn maps, as
well as more than forty illustrations.
Seventy-one pages of endnotes document Busch’s prodigious research, but
they are not easy to use, as they are
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linked to the text by quoted phrases
rather than numbered positions. Nevertheless, John Laurence Busch has made
a major contribution to American maritime history with this fine book.
JOHN B. HATTENDORF

Naval War College
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